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 We study the effects of economic globalization (liberalization of international trade and 
investment flows) on the environment in the context of a model that integrates standard 
factor endowment theory (FET) with the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). Both FET 
and PHH imply that inward investment burdens the environment while outward 
investment is favorable for environmental quality.  The model suggests that FET and 
PHH can be discriminated on the basis of the effects of the interaction between trade in 
goods and inward FDI on the environment. In particular, the interaction is positive under 
the former and negative under the latter theory. We examine the effects of FDI for SO2 
concentrations in a large set of countries during the last two decades. We find that inward 
FDI is associated with higher concentrations while outward FDI is associated with lower 
concentrations.  And that increased FDI amplifies the effects of increased trade.  The last 
result constitutes prima facie evidence in favor of the PHH over the FET.  
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Introduction 
 
A key economic development of the last couple of decades has been the significant 
increase in the degree of economic globalization. Globalization has operated mostly 
through three channels: Trade in goods and services; capital mobility; and international 
policy cooperation. Reductions in trade barriers and the relaxation or elimination of 
capital controls have led to increases in trade and capital flows that have outpaced the 
rate of economic growth. The degree of trade (the share of international trade in GDP) 
and asset (the share of foreign assets in GDP) openness are much higher now in 
comparison to 25 years ago. Similarly, participation in international organizations (such 
as the WTO or the EU) has expanded.  
Globalization has implications for many important issues, ranging from living 
standards to the distribution of economic and political power.  One such issue that 
occupies center stage at present in both the research and political agendas is the 
environment.  All three channels described above are thought to matter for environmental 
quality.   
According to standard trade theory, trade in goods worsens environmental quality 
in countries that have a comparative advantage in the production of “polluting” goods. 
The comparative advantage may derive either from the distribution of the world 
endowments of the factors of production (the factor endowments theory, FET), in which 
case the developed countries become dirtier with free trade due to their capital 
abundance. Or, from policy related differences in tolerance of pollution (the pollution 
haven hypothesis, PHH), in which case the less developed countries are expected to 
become dirtier with international trade due to pollution haven effects. Nevertheless, static   3 
trade theory abstracts from an important determinant of environmental quality that is 
affected by international trade, namely income. In a careful study that includes both the 
direct and indirect effects of trade, Antweiler et al., 2001, establish that in the long run 
such income (the so called technique) effects are sufficiently large as to overcome the 
negative effects arising from the scale and the composition of economic activity. They 
find that trade has had a positive effect on environmental quality as captured by SO2 
concentrations.  
The relationship between international capital mobility, in particular Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), and the environment has also received recently considerable 
attention, but almost exclusively at the empirical front (Barbieri, 2002; Christmann and 
Taylor, 2001; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Javorsik and Wei, 2004; Keller and 
Levinson, 2002; Mani and Wheeler, 1998; Millimet and List, 2004; Xing and Kolstad, 
2002). The theory underlying this body of work is the pollution haven hypothesis.  In a 
nutshell, this theory postulates that polluting firms will find it profitable to relocate to 
countries with “lax” environmental standards.  Consequently, FDI will worsen the 
environment in the receiving while improving it in the originating country.  
The empirical evidence on the relationship between FDI and environmental 
quality has so far been rather mixed. For instance, Keller and Levinson (2002) and Xing 
and Kolstad (2002) report –rather weak- support for the pollution haven hypothesis. 
Javorsik and Wei (2004), Xing and Kolstad (2002) and others report the absence of any 
link, or sometimes a positive association. The latter association could be accounted by 
findings such as that by Eskeland and Harrison (2003), that foreign owned plants are 
significantly more energy efficient and use cleaner types of energy than domestically   4 
owned plans.   Nonetheless, it should be noted that, to the best of our knowledge, there 
exists no theory predicting that FDI will involve more efficient and cleaner plants than 
domestic investment in countries with low environmental standards.   
The third channel regards international policy cooperation. Its influence on the 
quality of the environment is expected to be positive.  International policy cooperation 
can produce a globally cleaner environment by limiting free riding/externalities problems 
in the production of pollution. That is, by reducing the cross-country spillover effects of 
poor, national environmental policies.  This channel has not yet received as much 
scrutiny
1 as the other two and no reliable evidence has been presented so far regarding 
the sign and size of its impact. 
   The objective of this paper is twofold. First, to present a theoretical framework 
that contains an analysis of both international trade and FDI and it also encompasses 
pollution haven and standard trade theory (composition) effects.  We do so in the context 
of the so called specific factors (Viner) trade model, adapted to also include differences 
in environmental standards. And second, to examine the empirical evidence on the effects 
of trade and FDI –for the latter, using a comprehensive data set constructed recently at 
the IMF- on various indicators of environmental quality.   
The model predicts that inward FDI will have a negative effect and outward FDI a 
positive effect on the environment independent of which theory, the FET or the PHH, is 
the relevant one. But is also gives rise to a prediction that can be used to discriminate 
between these two theories.  If the pollution haven hypothesis plays the dominant role in 
                                                 
1 Ruoff (2006) is a notable exception but the focus of her study is on Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs).   5 
production and trade patterns, then one should expect that FDI will amplify the effects of 
free trade. That is, the less developed countries will become even dirties and the 
developed ones even cleaner as a result of international capital movements.  If on the 
other hand, differences in factor endowments play the key role in the determination of 
trade patterns, then one should expect that the effect of FDI will be to mitigate the effect 
of free trade
2. Hence, the interaction between growth in trade with growth in inward FDI 
is expected to be positive under the PHH and negative under the FET.  
We investigate the effects of international trade and FDI for SO2 concentrations in 
a large set of countries during the last 25 years.  We find that inward FDI is associated 
with higher concentrations while outward FDI is associated with lower concentrations.  
Inward FDI in the rich countries does not worsen the environment.  We also find that the 
interaction between growth in trade with growth in inward FDI results in worse 
environmental quality. The last finding provides support for the pollution haven 




The study of the effects of trade on the environment has relied on the workhorse of trade 
theory, the H-O model (see Antweiler et al., 2001).  This model, however, is not useful 
for studying trade and capital movements together, because of its implication that these 
                                                 
2 This is the case under the standard view that the developed countries are polluting 
capital abundant and the less developed countries are capital poor. That manufacturing is 
polluting capital intensive. And that manufacturing is more polluting than non-
manufacturing.   6 
two are perfect substitutes (Mundell, 1964). In particular, free trade brings about the 
international equalization of the rate of return on each factor of production, making 
international factor movements completely redundant.  In order to be able to examine 
trade and FDI flows jointly we will rely on the specific, factor model (see Caves, Frankel 
and Jones, 2001). The key difference between this and the H-O model is that it also 
contains factors that are industry specific. 
Let an economy produce two goods, x1 and x2. Production of good x1 utilizes 
capital (k1) and labor (h), while that of x2 utilizes a different type of capital (k2) and labor 
(h). In particular, the production functions in the two sectors take the form: 
 
(1)  x1 = Z1(k1)
b(h1)
1-b
   
 




with h1+ h2 = h. “z” is a measure of the efficiency of production. It can also be used to 
capture the stringency of environmental regulations. For instance, a high value may 
represent low stringency in environmental standards.  We will assume that k1 and k2 
cannot be substituted for one another, at least in the short-medium term. k1 and k2 are 
called the specific factors while h is the mobile –across sectors- factor.  
We assume that markets are competitive and that producers maximize profits, Π. 
In particular, producers in sector 1 choose k1
 and h1 in order to maximize 
 
(3)  Π1 = x1- wh1 - r1k1    
 
where w is the wage rate (common across sectors due to labor mobility) and r1 is the 
rental rate on capital in sector 1. The input demands are then given by 
 
(4)  bx1 = r1k1    (1-b)x1 = wh1       7 
 
Similarly, in sector 2, profits are Π2 = px2- wh2 – r2k2. Maximization leads to 
input demands 
 (5)  pcx2 = r2k2    (1-c)x2 = wh2   
 
Note that p is the relative price of good 2 in terms of good 1. We have set the 
price of good 1 (the numeraire) equal to unity. 
Most of the countries in the world represent small open economies, which means that 
they cannot influence p (the terms of trade).  Without loss of generality we will set b = c 
and z2=1, z1=z.  Using the second equations in (4)-(5) and the production functions 
allows us to solve for the allocation of labor across the two sectors and thus the levels of 
production x1 and x2 as a function of the aggregate endowments of the factors of 
production and the relative price.  In particular, 
 




-1     h2 = ((G-1)/G)*h 
 















2.1. Trade and the environment 
 
How does free trade affect the environment? In order to answer this question we need to 
know two things. First, which of the two activities is more polluting? And second, what is 
the trade pattern of the country under consideration?  
Concerning the sectoral contribution to pollution we will arbitrarily assume that 
sector 1 is the more polluting sector. For simplicity, we will also assume that the second 
sector does not create any pollution.    8 
The trade pattern depends on the comparison of the price that would have 
prevailed in the absence of trade, p
a, to the world price, p. If p
a > p then the country will 
export good 1 and import good 2 (it will have a comparative advantage in 1). The reverse 
pattern will obtain if p
a < p. In general, the difference between p
a and p will be 
determined by three factors involving a comparison across this country and the rest of the 
world: a) differences in consumption preferences over goods 1 and 2; b) differences in 
relative factor supplies, k1/k2; and c) differences in the stringency of environmental 
regulation as captured by differences in z. The first factor is usually ignored in the 
literature because it is hard to justify cross country variation in the utility function.  The 
second factor implies that countries that are relatively abundant in capital k1 will have a 
lower rental rate r1. This in turn implies that the cost of production and hence the price of 
good 1 will be lower in those countries, making it more likely that they will be exporters 
of this good.   Finally, the third factor implies that countries with less stringent 
environmental regulations will have a higher z and thus a lower cost of production in 
sector 1.  These countries will tend to become exporters of that good. This corresponds to 
the pollution haven hypothesis. 
 
Implications of free trade for environmental quality 
 
Proposition 1: With similar environmental standards across countries, a country that is 
abundant in the capital that is used in the polluting activities (it has a k1/k2 that exceeds 
that in the rest of the world) will expand the scale of the polluting activity under free 
trade.   Such a country will experience a deterioration in environmental quality as a result 
of greater international trade. 
   9 
Proposition 2: With similar environmental standards across countries, a country that is 
abundant in the capital that is used in the non-polluting activities (it has a k1/k2 that falls 
short of that in the rest of the world) will contract production of the polluting activity 
under free trade. Such a country will experience an improvement in environmental 
quality as a result of greater international trade. 
 
Proposition 3: With similar ratios of factor endowments across countries, a country with 
less stringent environmental regulations (a higher z) will expand production of the 
polluting activity under free trade (the pollution haven hypothesis).  
When both the ratios of the factors of production and environmental standards 
differ across countries, one needs to compare the relative strength of the effects described 
in Propositions (1)-(3) in order to arrive at the net effect of international trade on the 
quality of the environment.  Laxer environmental standards are not sufficient per se to 
induce a pollution heaven behavior as they may be dominated by the countervailing 
effects arising from differences in factor endowments across countries.  
 
2.2 FDI and the environment 
 
In order to determine the flows of FDI and their implications for environmental quality 
we need to determine factor prices in this country relative to the rest of the world under 
free trade.  Under perfect competition in factor markets, input prices are equal to the 
value of the corresponding marginal products (VMP). In particular, the wage rate, w is  
 








(11)  r2 = b(k2/h)
b-1(G/(G-1))
b-1   10 
 
It can be shown that dr1/dk1 < 0 and that dr1/dz > 0. Consequently, a country with a 
higher capital 1 (capital 2) to labor ratio will have a lower r1 (r2).  And a country with 
laxer environmental standards will, ceteris paribus, have a higher rate of return in the 
capital employed in the polluting industry.  
When capital is allowed to move across countries, it will move from countries 
with a low rate of return to countries with a high rate of return.  How will this behavior 
affect environmental quality? In order to answer this question we need to distinguish 
between FDI driven by differences in factor endowments –for given environmental 
standards- and FDI driven by differences in environmental regulation –for given factor 
endowments. 
 
Implications of FDI flows for environmental quality 
 
Proposition 4: With similar environmental standards across countries, a country that is 
abundant in the capital that is used in the polluting activities (it has a k1/k2 that exceeds 
that in the rest of the world) will witness an outflow of “polluting” capital and an inflow 
of “non-polluting” capital under free international capital mobility.  Such a country will 
experience a decrease in the scale of activity in the polluting sector
3 and hence an 
improvement in environmental quality as a result of FDI.   
 
                                                 
3 Note that the effect on outputs is magnified because the outflow of k1 (inflow of k2) will 
depress (increase) the marginal product of labor and thus wages in sector 1 (sector 2) 
drawing additional labor towards sector 2 at the expense of sector 1.    11 
Proposition 5:  With similar environmental standards across countries, a country that is 
abundant in the capital that is used in the non-polluting activities (it has a k1/k2 that falls 
short of that in the rest of the world) will witness an outflow of “non-polluting” capital 
and an inflow of “polluting” capital under free international capital mobility.  Such a 
country will experience an increase in the scale of activity in the polluting sector and 
hence a deterioration in environmental quality as a result of FDI. 
 
Proposition 6: With similar ratios of factor endowments across countries, a country with 
less stringent environmental regulations (a higher z) will attract polluting capital and 
witness an expansion of production in the polluting activity under free capital mobility 
(the pollution haven hypothesis).  
 
Propositions (1)-(6) give rise to diverse patterns, not only with regard to how 
international trade and FDI impact on environmental quality but also regarding their 
combined effects. The implication that can be used to discriminate between the two 
theories (factor endowments vs pollution haven) as an explanation of the effects of 
globalization on the environment is then as follows.  If the pollution haven hypothesis 
plays the dominant role in production and trade patterns, then one should expect that an 
increase in inward FDI will amplify the effects of growth in international trade. If, on the 
other hand, differences in factor endowments play the main role in the determination of 
trade patterns, then one should expect that the effects of inward FDI will go in the 
direction opposite from that of free trade. That is, there would be a negative effect of the 
interaction of these two aspects of globalization on the environment.    12 
Before concluding this section it is worth mentioning that there may be a third 
possibility, which could perhaps account for a positive effect of FDI on environmental 
quality in the receiving less developed countries. To the extent that capital flows from the 
developed to the less developed countries are directed mainly to the relatively low 
pollution activities, FDI could improve environmental prospects in the latter set of 
countries. This would take place if k1/k2 were low in the developed relative to the less 
developed countries. In such a case, both free trade and free capital movements would 
contribute to higher environmental quality in the less developed countries
4.       
 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
The data set is an unbalanced panel consisting of 153 countries and covering the period 
1990-2004 (annual data). Motivated by the theory developed in the previous section, we 
will estimate the following equation 
 
(1)  Qit = a0 + a1Tit + a2Iit + a3Xit + uit  
 
where the index it refers to country i in year t. Q is the environmental indicator. We rely 
mostly on SO2 because of its greater availability (more countries and years) and also 
because its measurement does not involve any judgment. But we also consider CO2 as 
well as environmental sustainability. 
                                                 
4 The finding of Eskeland and Harrison (2003) that foreign owned plants are significantly 
more energy efficient and use cleaner types of energy than the domestically owned ones 
seems consistent with this scenario.   13 
The dependent variable is the total level of SO2 multiplied by the density of the 
country (population divided by surface). This formulation takes into account the fact that 
the environmental effect of air pollutants depends on the number of people that are 
exposed to it, which in turn depends on the density of the population. Lacking relevant 
information on exposure we use the country density as a proxy.  
T represents the measure of trade. We use both a long and a short term measure. The 
former is given by the degree of openness (share of imports plus exports in GDP), while 
the latter by the growth rate of the trade share. The justification for the use of two distinct 
measures is that the former is more likely to capture the income (technique) effect 
documented by Antweiler et al., 2001. While the latter may capture the short run effects 
of trade liberalization as well as the indirect effect that fluctuations in FDI have on the 
environment through the resulting fluctuations in international trade in goods. In order to 
capture the interaction between growth in FDI and growth in trade we use the product of 
these two growth rates
5  
I is the measure of FDI. We will use two variables, FDI assets (outward FDI) and FDI 
liabilities (inward FDI) as the theory suggests that the effect of these two variables should 
go in opposite directions in each country. The data come from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
who have recently constructed a comprehensive data set on the foreign assets and 
liabilities for all countries in the world. For international positions in equity, they 
distinguish between portfolio investment and foreign direct investment. The latter 
                                                 
5 While we report results with the product of the contemporaneous growth rates, that is, 
∆(Trade(t))*∆(FDI(t)) it should be noted that the same results obtain when we use lagged 
values for the FDI. Namely, ∆(Trade(t))*∆(FDI(t-1)).   14 
involves domestic acquisitions of foreign equity that exceeds 10% of the firm in which 
the investment takes place. 
X contains a set of additional explanatory variables. It includes standard economic (GDP 
per capita and the scale of economic activity) and political variables (the degree of 
democracy, corruption). The scale of economic activity is measured by the product of 
GDP per capita and the country density. The degree of democracy is measured by the 
POLITY variable. Finally, X includes some other related variables such as participation 
in international organizations, the number of treaties a country has signed and/or ratified. 





A large body of theoretical and empirical literature focuses on economic determinants of 
environmental quality. It has led to the identification of an important empirical pattern 
(e.g., Grossman and Kruger, 1995; Selden and Song, 1994). In particular, some forms of 
environmental degradation, e.g., SO2 air pollution, follow a Kuznets curve pattern. That 
is, pollution first deteriorates and then improves as income per capita increases. The 
standard interpretation of this finding is that environmental quality is a luxury good in the 
initial stages of economic development. Poor countries facing a trade-off between 
protecting the environment and improving material living standards opt for the latter. 
Once significant gains have been made in living standards, the opportunity cost of stricter 
environmental policies becomes (relatively) smaller and voters are prepared to accept 
lower economic or personal income growth (the two may not be identical) in order to 
enjoy less pollution (the environment becomes a normal good).  In order to text for the   15 
existence of a Kuznets pattern we include the square of gdp alongside its level (to avoid 
very small numbers we have normalized the level of gdp by dividing it by its sample 
median).  
Scale effect: Intensity of economic activity: activity 
The larger the scale of economic activity per unit is, the higher the level of environmental 
degradation (i.e., pollution) is likely to be. That is, increased economic activity tends to 
result in more SO2 emissions and thus higher levels of ambient SO2 concentration. We 
measure the scale of economic activity by GDP per square kilometer. This measure 
reflects the concentration of economic activity within a given geographical area. It is 
constructed by multiplying per capita GDP by population density (population / square 
kilometers) – this, in effect, results in a coefficient measuring GDP per square kilometer. 





Political System: Polity 
Many authors (Olson, 1993; McGuire and Olson, 1996; Niskanen, 1997; Lake and Baum, 
2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003) have argued that non-democratic regimes are likely 
to underprovide public goods, including environmental quality. Hence we should expect 
a positive relationship between democracy and environmental quality. Others have 
claimed, however, that in democratic countries special interest groups enjoy 
disproportionate influence on policymaking (Olson, 1965, 1982; Midlarsky, 1998). This 
implies that public goods (environmental quality) may be underprovided in the presence 
of strong special interest groups opposing environmental policies. The same may be true   16 
if elected politicians overweighed short-run benefits in the presence of long-term 
environmental degradation (Congelton, 1992). 
Our measure for the political system variable is an index capturing the extent of 
democratic participation in government, Polity, from the POLITY IV data set. It is a 
composite index that includes the following elements: presence of competitive political 
participation, guarantee of openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power. Polity ranges 
from –10 (mostly autocratic) to 10 (mostly democratic) (Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
With a view to the abovementioned theoretical arguments we expect the sign of the 
relationship between democratic political systems and environmental quality to be 
ambiguous. 
Government quality: corruption 
Bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption seems to contribute to environmental 
degradation too. According to the authors of the Environmental Sustainability Index 
(2005) that ranks nations by environmental performance, bureaucratic inefficiency and 
corruption are among the most highly correlated (among the 67 quality-of-life variables 
included in the index) with poor environmental quality. One possible explanation for this 
relationship might be that in highly corrupt societies, government officials accept bribes 
in return for not enacting environmental regulations and enforcing environmental laws.  
Moreover, Desai (1998) shows that corruption contributes significantly to environmental 
degradation in developing countries. 
Participation in international environmental treaties: signature and/or ratification 
International treaties oblige its member countries to cooperate on environmental   17 
problems such as air or water pollution, climate change, trade in toxic waste and 
endangered species etc (Ward 2006).  
In order to capture the strength of environmental protection in each country, we employ 
the degree of participation (signature and/or ratification) in international environmental 
protection treaties.    
 
Estimation method 
The data form an unbalanced panel. Following standard practice in the literature for this 
type of data we employ the Prais-Winsten model with panel-corrected standard errors 
(see Beck and Katz, 1995). We have also repeated the analysis using alternative 
estimation methods for panel data such as the Arellano-Bond linear, dynamic panel data 
estimator or fixed or random effects estimation. The main results are robust across 




Main results  
Tables 1-3 report the estimation results. The following patterns obtain regarding the 
effects of FDI and trade:  
1. FDI outflows improve the environment (the coefficient on FDIA is negative and 
statistically significant in Tables 1 and 3). 
2. FDI inflows worsen the environment (the coefficient on FDIA is positive and 
statistically significant in Tables 1 and 3). 
3. FDI inflows into the developed countries do not matter for the environment (Table 2)   18 
4. The combined effect of an increase in the degree of openness and an increase in FDI 
inflows is positive (Table 3).  
5. The effect of the level of international trade on pollution is negative. As Antweiler et 
al. 2001, argue, this is a reflection of the technique effect. 
Findings (1)-(4) can be used to evaluate the two competing theories discussed in the 
paper, the FET and the PHH.  (1), (2) are consistent with both the FET and the PHH.  (3) 
is consistent with the PHH and the FET. Recall that according to the FET, inflows of 
capital into the developed countries must go into the non-polluting activities because the 
rate of return in those activities is higher than in the rest of the world.  The PHH has the 
same implication: Clean capital will flow into the countries that have higher 
environmental standards, while dirty capital will go into the countries with the less 
stringent environmental regulation.  
It is finding (4) that has discriminating power across the two theories as explained 
in the previous section. Recall that a positive coefficient on the interactive term favors the 
PHH while a negative one favors the FET.  
What about the environmental effects of the other variables?  There is a clear 
Kuznets effect present. The estimated coefficient of GDP on pollution is positive while 
that of the square of GDP is negative.  The effect of the scale of economic activity is 
positive, that is more activity increases concentration of SO2. The contribution of 
democracy on the quality of the environment is negative. This seems paradoxical, and we 
do not have a good explanation for it. Finally, participation in international organization, 
either in terms of signing or ratifying international agreements does not make it more or 




3. Conclusions     
 
We study the effects of economic globalization (liberalization of international trade and 
investment flows) on the environment in the context of a model that integrates standard 
factor endowment theory (FET) with the pollution haven hypothesis (PHH). Both FET 
and PHH imply that inward investment burdens the environment while outward 
investment is favorable for environmental quality.  The model suggests that FET and 
PHH can be discriminated on the basis of the effects of the interaction between trade in 
goods and inward FDI on the environment. In particular, the interaction is positive under 
the former and negative under the latter theory. We examine the effects of FDI for SO2 
concentrations in a large set of countries during the last two decades. We find that inward 
FDI is associated with higher concentrations while outward FDI is associated with lower 
concentrations.  And that increased FDI amplifies the effects of increased trade.  The last 
result constitutes prima facie evidence in favor of the PHH over the FET.  
 
   20 
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Table 1: The effects of FDI Assets and Liabilities on SO2 All countries 
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors 
 
 
                      Coef.           Std. Err.      z         P>|z|      
        year     -3.728664     .595145     -6.27    0.000     
       trade    -.3427186    .0610113     -5.62    0.000     
        fdia      -5.392294    3.233076    -1.67    0.095     
        fdil        8.357891     2.12145      3.94    0.000      
        acti       .0000175     3.79e-06      4.62    0.000      
      polity      1.155314    .2583641      4.47    0.000      
         gdp      .0079894     .0019032      4.20    0.000      
       gdpsq     -.5793293    .1154191    -5.02    0.000     
    cumsign1   -.1323682   .4541033    -0.29    0.771     
      cons         7463.009     1175.531     6.35    0.000      
 
Obs      =      2934 
R-squared  =  0.2295  
Wald chi2(9) =  135.89 






Table 2: The effects of FDI Liabilities on SO2 in the 50% richest countries  
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors 
 
  Coef.  Std.Err.  z  P>|z| 
year  -6.301  0.915  -6.880  0.000 
trade  -0.527  0.127  -4.150  0.000 
tradegr  0.251  0.069  3.620  0.000 
fdil  0.444  1.110  0.400  0.692 
acti  0.000  4.130  3.480  0.001 
polity  2.099  0.349  6.010  0.000 
gdp  0.000  0.000  -0.340  0.735 
cumsign1  0.072  0.479  0.150  0.880 
_cons  126.270  18.140  6.960  0.000 
 
Prob > chi2        =    0.000 
R-squared          =    0.1314 
Wald chi2(8)       =    111.58 
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
   24 
 
Table 3: Discriminating between the PHH and the FET  
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors 
 
                          Coef.          Std. Err.       z           P>|z|      
        year        -4.118715      .652437     -6.31     0.000     
       trade       -.4021671      .0770706     -5.22    0.000     
tradegr-fdilgr    3.181579      .9709716      3.28    0.001      
        fdil          7.741333      2.160031      3.58    0.000       
        fdia        -6.051423      3.130561      -1.93    0.053     
        acti          .0000158      3.66e-06        4.31    0.000      
      polity         .7900307      .2394555       3.30    0.001      
         gdp            .006159     .0020623        2.99    0.003       
       gdpsq        -.4647869    .1132749       -4.10    0.000     
     cumrat1         .2872001    .2982913       0.96    0.336     
      cons             8234.036     1288.65         6.39    0.000      
 
Obs      =      2765 
R-squared          =    0.2105 
Wald chi2(10)      =    112.56 
Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
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Appendix 
Data and sources 
 
SO2: Stern (1998) available under http://www.rpi.edu/~sternd/datasite.htm 
  
Trade: Total trade in millions of current year US dollars according to the Gleditsch and 
Ward data set of Expanded Trade and GDP data version 4.1 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/exptradegdp.html 
 
FDI: Available from Milesi-Feretti (IMF). 
 
GDP: Real GDP per capita in US-dollars according to the Expanded Trade and GDP 
dataset of Gleditsch version 4.1 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/exptradegdp.html 
 
Corruption: Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.org/polity_research/surveys_ indices/cpi  
 
 
Signature/ratification: ENTRI dataset by CIESIN http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu./entri 
 
Population: Total population in thousands of a state according to the Expanded Trade 
and GDP dataset of Gleditsch version 4.1 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/exptradegdp.html 
 
 
 